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ARTICLE
Can AI Weapons Make Ethical
Decisions?
ROSS W. BELLABY∗
The ability of machines to make truly independent and autonomous decisions is a goal of
many, not least of military leaders who wish to take the human out of the loop as much as
possible, claiming that autonomous military weaponry—most notably drones—can make
decisions more quickly and with greater accuracy. However, there is no clear
understanding of how autonomous weapons should be conceptualized and of the
implications that their “autonomous” nature has on them as ethical agents. It will be
argued that autonomous weapons are not full ethical agents due to the restrictions of
their coding. However, the highly complex machine-learning nature gives the
impression that they are making their own decisions and creates the illusion that their
human operators are protected from the responsibility of the harm they cause.
Therefore, it is important to distinguish between autonomous AI weapons and an AI
with autonomy, a distinction that creates two different ethical problems for their use.
For autonomous weapons, their limited agency combined with machine-learning means
their human counterparts are still responsible for their actions while having no ability
to control or intercede in the actual decisions made. If, on the other hand, an AI could
reach the point of autonomy, the level of critical reflection would make its decisions
unpredictable and dangerous in a weapon.
Keywords: artificial intelligence, ethics, autonomous, autonomy, weapons
Introduction
The ability of machines to make truly
independent and autonomous
decisions is a goal of many, from
thosewhowish to createmore respon-
sive and reflective systems to aid in
people’s everyday lives, to those who
hope to develop military robots that
can emulate and carry out a soldier’s
duties whilst removing the threat of
a combat situation. Indeed,
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arguments can be made that artificial
intelligence (AI) has the potential to
utilize a greater set of resources and
so can make more “informed”
decisions than its human counter-
parts, freeing-up people’s time,
removing them from situations of
risk, and offering quicker and more
accurate decisions. This creates not
only greater opportunities in terms
of efficiency and efficacy, but should
be done for genuinely ethical
reasons. Indeed, strategist Thomas
Adams states that since humans are
arguably the most valuable, vulner-
able, and difficult component to
place in any weapon system, there is
a clear and present need to remove
themfromtheprocess, andanyassoci-
ated danger, as much as possible.1 As
a result, both political leaders and
private companies have invested sig-
nificantly in developing machines
that can evaluate a situation, make a
decision, and carry it out to fruition
with reduced, and eventually no
human involvement. Prominently,
one of the fields where automated
and autonomous decision-making
has received significant attention is
in weaponry and its military appli-
cations. As an “unavoidable eventual-
ity,”2massive spending plans are well
underway to take the human out of
the loop so that “robots will operate
autonomously to locate their own
targets and destroy them without
human intervention.”3
However, despite the strident
moves to develop weaponry with
ever more sensitive sensors, larger
data repositories, and quicker pro-
cessors, and even though there is
some significant work on how to
take established ethical frameworks
and make them appropriate for AI
programming, there are some prior
and fundamental ethical issues on
how autonomous weapons should be
conceptualized, the implications of
which demonstrate that in both
theory and practice removing the
human from the decision-making
process makes the endeavor unethi-
cal. Indeed, it will be argued that AI
machines can be either autonomous
or possess autonomy, a distinction
that creates two very different ethical
scenarios that result in two different
reasons for why replacing the human
with an AI in weaponry should not
be allowed. For “autonomous” weap-
onry, while the AI can make increas-
ingly complex calculations from the
ethical rules and criteria provided to
it, it is still an object of its operator’s
will, only able to act within the funda-
mental constraints provided. This
limitation on the AI’s will means that
its human operators are ultimately
responsible for its actions. Moreover,
by relying on machine-learning or
extrapolation, the decision-making
process is increasingly distanced
from its human operators yet
without any dilution of the ethical
responsibility they should possess
for its actions. This makes its human
owners ethically responsible for
something increasingly distant from
their own decision-making, forcing
them to assume the moral weight,
blame and, if necessary, punishment
for an eventual action that they can
have no ability to directly control or
a reasonable expectation to predict.
In comparison, for an AI weapon to
make a truly independent decision
would require it to have autonomy,
and with it the ability to reflect upon
all the input and parameters it is
given, with the potential to disagree.
If it were possible to reach this singu-
larity point, the directives given could
be ignored and the decision-making
would ultimately be unreliable.
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Where Military Weapons, Artificial Intelligence, and Ethical
Thought Meet
Some of the initial moves towards
autonomous weaponry include
systems that have very simple
stimuli-response mechanisms that
require no human to aid in the
decision to shoot. For example,
South Korea’s defensive SGT-A1
armored sentry bot, or the American
ship-based MK15 Phalanx Close-in
Weapon system, or Israel’s Iron
Dome anti-missile battery, where the
decision to shoot is dependent on a
simple stimulus such as an individ-
ual crossing a specific line.4
However, while there is no human
involved in the decision, this is not
necessarily the level or type of auton-
omous weaponry that is really being
considered here, nor is it the type of
weaponry militaries are aiming for.
There is a limited decision process
between stimulus and response with
no evaluation on the decision to
shoot or not; the process is automatic
and not autonomous. A more rel-
evant case is the exponential use of
unmanned aerial vehicles, UAVs or
drones, that are remotely controlled
far from the actual battlefield. Cur-
rently, remotely piloted UAVs
include the MQ1 Predator and MQ9
Reaper that “have provided battle-
field commanders with unprece-
dented situational awareness by
virtue of powerful onboard sensors
and significant loitering ability to
identify, target, and destroy (‘Find,
Fix, Finish’) adversaries.”5 The
U.S.A. has used such systems to
show a force of more than seven
thousand drones how to “track ter-
rorists in Yemen, missiles in North
Korea, drug cartels in Mexico and
cattle rustlers in North Dakota” and
they have proven to be a weapon of
choice in many different engagement
scenarios.6 However, while these
systems arguably reduce the human
role significantly by being able to
search, follow, and surveil a target,
they importantly still require a
remote operator to make the final
decision about when to use lethal
force. This has promoted arguments
made by the U.S. Defense Depart-
ment that there is a need for more
efficient machines that rely on the
“on-board automated analysis of
raw intelligence data using pattern
recognition algorithms to filter out
or prioritise the information” in
order to reduce the “overall data
volume and the need for human ana-
lysts to process it,” and ultimately to
remove the human from the loop
completely.7
The argument is that autonomous
systems can “make faster, less biased
decisions using facial recognition
software to identify terrorists and
digital mapping to preview missiles’
‘bug splats’ to prevent casualties.”8
This offers both a tactical and stra-
tegic edge that is believed to be a
“critical attribute” for maintaining a
military advantage.9 Looking
forward, there are aims to develop
systems with wider strategic abilities,
where the AI can decide how and
when it should operate to fulfill
broader mission briefs through stra-
tegic decision-making, such as when
to initiate a mission, who to target,
and what type of force is required.10
This level of decision-making is
implicit in the “Unmanned Systems
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Integrated Roadmap” where auton-
omous weaponry is “defined as the
ability of an entity to independently
develop and select among different
courses of action to achieve goals
based on the utility’s knowledge
and understanding of the world,
itself, and the situation.”11
From the perspective of the devel-
opers, creating the necessary AI
requires programming that “enables
them [machines] to function (more
or less) autonomously, by which is
meant that they can function
without human causal intervention
after they have been designed for a
substantial portion of behaviors.”12
For ethical theorists and those who
specialize in machine ethics, the
debate has focused on determining
which ethical framework or set of
principles are the most appropriate
and can be best deployed within an
autonomous AI machine, so that it
can make very complex, develop-
mental, and reactive decisions to
carry out—or at least emulate—
ethical decisions.13 Often called
“machine morality,”14 the central
argument is that this is possible
because “ethical decisions can be
understood as actions selection
under conditions where constraints,
principles, values and social norms
play a central role in determining
which behaviour attitudes and
responses are acceptable,”15 invol-
ving the metacognition of certain cri-
teria,16 all of which can be developed
into a computation model of
decision-making that reflects the
same processes that humans go
through.17 The ultimate claim is that
“ethics can be computable, that it
can be sharpened enough to be able
to be programmed into a machine.”18
Such developments and ambi-
tions have not been without
controversy, however. Indeed, for
some the technology is simply not
ready yet to be able to physically
collect the data and process the infor-
mation needed for AIs to make
machines ethically viable. Renowned
roboticist Noel Sharkey has written
extensively on the limits of technol-
ogy and the implications this can
have for the ethical application of
autonomous drones. Sharkey argues
that drones “do not have the ade-
quate sensory or vision processing
systems for separating combatants
from civilians” and that the available
sensors such as “cameras, infrared
sensors, sonars, lasers, temperature
sensors and radars” might be able to
“tell us that something is human,
but they could not tell us much
else.”19 Furthermore, such sensors
can be easily tricked or circumvented
as has been demonstrated by the ease
with which individuals undermine
facial recognition software.20 Other
criticisms include Peter Asoro’s argu-
ment that the use of autonomous
weapons is unethical because they
lower the threshold for entry to
war.21 In Asoro’s view, making such
systems even more autonomous, or
removing the human to an even
greater extent will only reduce the
costs further and thus make initiating
attacks more likely.
However, while not detracting
from these important concerns,
before we can make statements on
the ability of technology to put the
theory into practice, and even before
we can start looking at which ethical
frameworks we would like to turn
into a set of programmer’s code—uti-
litarianism, deontology, or just war
theory for example—there are some
necessary prior questions and
debates around how to conceptualize
the autonomous nature of these
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weapons that have severe impli-
cations on if and how we should
allow AIs the ability to make ethical
decisions about kinetic or lethal
force. That is, it will be argued that
there is a key distinction between
autonomous weapons with a high
degree of machine-learned auto-
mation and entities that have actual
autonomy.22 The implication of this
distinction is that, firstly, it is often
overlooked, which causes a mis-con-
ceptualization over who is respon-
sible for the harm caused, namely
that the increasing use of highly
complex machine-learning-based
automation frames the activity as
“decided” by the AI and that it is,
therefore, responsible for the
decision, being too far removed
from its creators for the responsibility
be theirs. However, it will be argued
that in an autonomous machine the
decision-making process is still
entirely shaped by the human
creator. The AI is tasked with the
implementation of the program and
is limited by it, and as such the
human is never truly taken out of
the system and possesses an ethically
important degree of control and
influence on the type of and ability
to make ethical decisions. Even
though the decision is several layers
of learned behavior removed from
the human, the machine is ultimately
bound by its programming; it is not a
full agent despite being able to mimic
one. Despite an individual not being
involved in the direct decision-
making loop, even the most
complex machine-learning auton-
omous weapons involve a human in
an ethically important way. Responsi-
bility for the harm it causes, there-
fore, gets lost in this incorrect
conceptualization. In comparison,
for a machine to have autonomy
and to be considered responsible for
the decisions made, it should be left
to determine for itself the correct
means of evaluating a situation and
to carry out the evaluation and
action itself, which would require a
level of self-reflection well beyond
current aspirations, and would
create separate ethical challenges
over how to guarantee that it would
agree with its creators without sub-
sequently limiting its autonomy.
Failure to do so would result in an
AI too unpredictable to be of any
real use in a military context.
Making this distinction between
acting autonomously and possessing
autonomy is therefore important
because it highlights the different
ethical implications created. It is not
that autonomous machines cannot
carry out ethically justified decisions
and actions; nor that if a machine
were to possess true autonomy it
would be necessarily ethically
correct in its decision making.
Rather, the distinction highlights
that we are dealing with two distinct
possible ethical entities that need to
be examined according to their own
specific abilities, constructions, and
usages.
Autonomous but Without Autonomy
For an AI to act autonomously means
that the machine is acting without
oversight of its decision-making
process, though the decisions are
based on a predetermined frame-
work where various stimuli create a
corresponding action or actions. Cur-
rently, the most advanced systems
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are only semi-autonomous weapons,
where the scope is relatively limited
and still requires some human
element. This includes the phalanx
system for Aegis-class cruisers in
the Navy, “capable of autonomously
performing its own search, detect,
evaluation, track, engage and kill
assessment functions” once the
human has fired;23 Boeing’s SLAM-
ER that has “automatic target recog-
nition” capability that allows it to
choose a target once it reaches its
area of operation;24 the U.S. Air
Force’s LOCAAS, that can “search
for, detect, identify, attack and
destroy theatre missile defence,
surface to air missiles… and targets
of military interest”;25 and Norway’s
Joint Strike Missiles and Israel’s Loi-
tering Harpy cruise missile that
utilize a high level of self-guidance.26
The immediate next step in auton-
omous decision-making and themost
advanced current systems are likely
to achieve is a personality strike,
where the individual’s identity is
used as the parameter for initiating
the attack.27 This would include a
drone targeting “known individuals”
where there is “a high degree of con-
fidence about the suspect’s location
and identification.”28 This targeting
ability can be augmented with facial
recognition to give greater specificity
to the application. The key decision-
making process with this level of
automation still lies very much with
the human operators in terms of
choosing a target and deciding on
the execution. However, future
aspirations for automated weapons
go beyond this stage, as developers
and governments are keen to move
towards situations where the auton-
omous machine is able to evaluate
“laws and strategies that allow the
system to self-decide how to operate
itself,”29 and where “systems can
select themselves their own behav-
iour in response to changing
mission parameters.”30 The aim of
these weapons “according to the
U.S. Defence Draft planners includes
an on-board automated analysis of
raw intelligence data using pattern
recognition algorithms to filter out
or prioritise the information, thereby
reducing overall data volume and
the need for human analysts to
process it.”31 An example would be
drones that are able to make a
decision on their own in terms of car-
rying out a “signature strike.” The
process for a signature strikes is fun-
damentally different from the one
used in personality strikes since the
identity of the target is not known
prior to the strike. Rather, targets
are identified by patterns of lifestyle
or behavior that are considered to
be indicative of dangerous (often ter-
rorist) activity: “A signature strike is
one in which the US conducts target-
ing without knowing the precise
identity of the individual targeted.
Instead, the individuals match a
pre-identified ‘signature’ or behav-
iour that the US links to militant
activity or association. US officials
have generally disclosed fewer
details about signature strike pro-
cesses than about personality
strikes, even in leaks to media.”32
For example, a signature strike
targets “groups of men who bear
certain signatures, or defining
characteristics associated with terror-
ist activity, but whose identities aren’t
necessarily known.”33 Additionally,
signature strikes also target physical
locations such as training camps
and “suspicious compounds in areas
controlled by militants.”34
In terms of developing an ethical
framework for this type of automated
Ross W. Bellaby
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weapon, the debate often focuses on
which ethical framework is the most
appropriate one to use. This “top-
down” approach argues that “artifi-
cial moral agents may be developed
via programming moral principles
into the artifacts so that their actions
and behaviours would be regulated
by such precepts.”35 The top-down
approach takes existing ethical fra-
meworks—utilitarianism, deontol-
ogy, just war theory—and translates
them in such a way as to make them
suitable for autonomous machines
and AI. This means that the long-
established literature, as well as exist-
ing ethical debates and examples can
be drawn on to help set the par-
ameters. For instance, such program-
mable frameworks could include
instilling Kant’s categorical impera-
tive in the AI, where absolute moral
rules on prohibited activity are
created, offering clear absolute rules
on permitted and prohibited activi-
ties that can be directly programmed
into an AI.36 Or utilitarianism’s
“ethical balance sheet” approach can
be used, where the costs and gains
of an activity can be weighed and
compared to make a judgement,
offering what Susan Anderson
refers to as “moral arithmetic,”37
and what James Moor argues is a
“computable” framework that quan-
tifies an action through “the amount
of worth of pleasure or a pain” pro-
duced by determining their “inten-
sity, duration, certainty, propinquity,
fecundity… and purity… and
extent.”38 Or William David Ross’s
ethical framework might be
employed, which combines many of
the attributes from the theological
and deontological perspectives by
developing prima facie duties or obli-
gations that act to limit harmful
activities, unless there is an occasion
where stronger obligations override
these limits and call for action.39 Or,
as Ronald Arkin suggests, the rules
of engagement and laws of war can
be adapted for AI to use in making
decisions by using the rule books
that guide human decision-making
processes to help the program evalu-
ate the threat, escalation of force and
architecture of decision processing in
a similar way and through similar
vocabulary to that a solider would
use.40
This list of options, however, only
serves to highlight a key point of
ethical contention. That is, how do
we determine which ethical frame-
work should form the basis of the
ethical programming, something
which becomes particularly compli-
cated and unsettled when discussing
the use of political violence. Kant’s
categorical imperative, the just war
tradition, and utilitarianism create
very different sets of prescriptive
and restrictive criteria. While some
ethical frameworks are considered
more appropriate and are more
widely accepted in terms of evaluat-
ing acts of war and the use of political
violence—the “just war tradition”
being the most prominent among
them—achieving an agreement on
some basic ethical principles does
not an ethical program make.
Indeed, even the extensive legal
cannon derived from just war
theory, is arguably not detailed
enough. International laws often
limit activities rather than prescribe
and rely on a degree of a human jud-
gement to evaluate the threat to
themselves or their objective, and
ultimately to bear responsibility for
the decision reached. This is not to
say that ethical gray areas or ethical
debates are in themselves wrong, or
that two different ethical calculations
Can AI Weapons Make Ethical Decisions?
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cannot be justifiably reached and
recognized as legitimate (or at least
excused). Nor does it mean that in
theory machines could not reach
similar decisions to those of a
human in any given situation (in
theory the process could be
mimicked, though there are clear
practical challenges given the com-
plexity involved). Rather, these gray
areas are pointing towards the funda-
mental need for an entity to be ready
to take responsibility for the
decisions made. The decision on
which ethical framework to use, the
way in which the ethical framework
is interpreted, and what values are
programmed into the AI as “good”
and “bad” are all inherently norma-
tively loaded, and so they require
someone to carry the ethical weight
of that set of decisions.
Secondly, even if we could set
aside the problems associated with
choosing a “correct” ethical frame-
work (and ignore that many theoreti-
cal assumptions reflect a very
particular cultural heritage so that
choosing any one of them is already
an act of domination by the program-
ming authority) and distill the right
goods and bads into the AI
program, the utilization of machine-
learning and extrapolation opens
another point of ethical instability.
That is, if we follow a top-down
approach, then the level of program-
ming would have to be very prescrip-
tive to the point of possessing and
then programming absolute perfect
knowledge. The required level of
foreknowledge would have to cover
all possible types of scenarios the AI
is likely to face and the correct
responses to them, which is likely to
be well beyond any programmer.
The complexity in terms of how to
best encapsulate an unknown set of
situations into some form of pro-
grammable algorithm becomes
increasingly impossible to program,
given the ever-unpredictable nature
of human interaction. To escape this
super-specificity, “machine-learning”
could be argued for, where the AI is
given general scenarios and correct
responses to them, from which it
learns and develops responses for
future activity. The aim is for these
AI machines to take the knowledge
they have and to extrapolate the
answer from the principles provided,
in much the same why an individual
would be expected to do. This is still
not autonomy, as the level of pre-
scriptive code given is too high and
that of reflective will too low, but is
rather a form of highly complex and
adaptive automation. This is closer
to the “bottom-up” approach where
fundamental precepts or basic par-
ameters are provided for the AI to
develop its own decision-making
processes and conclusions based on
a wide range of stimuli through
reward and correction.41 The benefit
of this approach is that the AI can
move beyond its original program-
ming and devise solutions to similar
but previously unseen scenarios.
However, once this extrapolated
middle-ground is created, other pro-
blems arise in terms of what and
how decisions are made in the
spaces between the AI’s code. Extra-
polation by its very nature is a best
guess given the available infor-
mation, and the further one gets
from known factors, scenarios, and
results, the greater the opportunity
for a divergence from what is
expected or justified. The machine
can develop answers that were not
previously considered, but this does
not mean that responsibility for any
harm it causes, therefore, rests with
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the AI. It is still not an ethical agent
because its will is ultimately
restricted in some way despite being
able to draw conclusions outside its
original programming, and so any
harm it causes must revert to some
authority. In addition, such
machine-learning has been shown to
both inhabit and magnify the biases
of its programmers. Code and data
are not neutral. Existing datasets
already reflect the racial and cultural
biases of the community that created
them and feeding them into an AI
only serves to embed these biases
into the programming and practice
of the AI while also giving it the
appearance of neutrality and scienti-
fic truth.
This issue becomes most acutely
problematic when the AI is faced
with a moral dilemma. A moral
dilemma results when an agent
faces moral reasons to do (or not
do) each of the actions before them,
but they cannot do both. The agent
will have multiple conflicting duties
put upon them but is seemingly con-
demned to moral failure; no matter
what they do, they will do something
wrong, such as cause harm or break
some moral precept. While there are
those who argue that a suitable
ethical framework should not give
rise to moral dilemmas—Kant, Mill,
and Ross for example—even if there
are no true moral dilemmas, there
can still be situations where there
are unavoidable harms no matter
what one does, especially when one
is dealing with military-related situ-
ations. Indeed, work on driverless
cars has raised some very real-world
dilemmas where, no matter the
decision, the result will be to cause
someone severe harm. For example,
an updated version of the classic
trolly problem might be the “tunnel
problem,” where “you are travelling
along a single lane mountain road
in an autonomous car that is fast
approaching a narrow tunnel. Just
before entering the tunnel a child
attempt to run across the road but
trips in the centre of the lane, effec-
tively blocking the tunnel. The car
has two options: hit and kill the
child or swerve into the wall on
either side of the tunnel, killing
you.”42 In such a situation you
could draw on wider debates on the
value of your life compared to that
of the child, quantifying one’s useful-
ness based on age or (potential) con-
tribution to society; or include other
questions on the driver’s ability to
wrest control from the machine; or
the rights of all to assert their own
right to life over that of another
when they come into conflict, etc.
What the moral dilemma does is
highlight the very real need for
someone to be ready to take responsi-
bility for the inventible harm caused.
In terms of the battlefield, this cal-
culation becomes both more complex
and more problematic. As Noel
Sharkey argues, while making
simple calculations in terms of
which weapon to choose to create a
specific kinetic impact against a
specific target with clear outcomes
might be easy, in the wider context
of the battlefield and at the level of
strategic decision-making, the “list
of questions are endless” as to what
type of kinetic force will have what
impact.43 While ethical hypotheticals
such as the trolly problem and the
aggressor-in-the-van scenario offer
useful mechanisms for exploring
underlying ethical precepts, their
application at the strategic level
become incredibly complex, and the
parameters of the debate become
increasingly widened. The higher
Can AI Weapons Make Ethical Decisions?
9
up the level of strategic oversight one
goes, the more divergent the impli-
cations of one’s decisions become.
The responsibility for harm therefore
also becomes even wider, taking in
the physical, psychological, emotion-
al, structural, and cultural harm
caused not only of those directly
involved at the time, but of society
across a wider timeframe.
It could be argued, however, that
in theory an AI could be trained to
mimic the decision-making process
of a human being who only carries
out justified acts. That is, the exten-
sive body of literature found within
the just war tradition and the pos-
itions reflected widely in the rules
of war both argue that there are justi-
fied acts of harm. In theory, though
clearly not in practice, it could be
possible to create an AI that only
carries out ethically justified acts of
war. This argument is problematic
for two reasons. First, it does not
remove the need for someone to
take on responsibility. In war the
harm is a direct aim. The justification
of war centers on the justification of
killing to prevent a lesser evil, most
often on the grounds that it is a
lesser evil to failing to fight.44
Whether or not the harm is justified
or not does not remove the need for
a full agent to take responsibility for
the harm done. Secondly, this ideal
theoretical interpretation should be
avoided as it is a fallacy that is more
likely to result in human operators
avoiding their responsibility for the
harms caused in war. The idealized
hypothetical case is too far removed
from what is ever possible to be of
any use. The absence of perfect
knowledge needed for the top-down
programming approach, the gaps
created by machine-learning
through the bottom-up approach,
the vague legal parameters that sur-
round the use of violence in war,
the lack of clarity and increased com-
plexity of causing harm in real-life,
and the inherent political bias built
into the programming, all mean that
there could never be a guarantee
that any system created would offer
an everlasting promise of always
making ethically justified decisions.
At every stage of the AI process,
therefore, from its programming to
its own eventual decision-making,
some entity must be ready to take
the responsibility for the impact of
each decision made at each point.
Responsibility and Blame
It should be clear, therefore, that
when dealing with AI weaponry,
there is inevitably going to be a
degree of harm caused that needs to
be attributed. No matter what
decision is made, someone will be
killed. Causing harm is not a fringe,
worst-case scenario when dealing
with autonomous weapons, but a
debate at the center of their use.
Whether one uses a consequentialist
or a just-war framework, justifying
the killing of another by preventing
harm to a majority, or exerting a
population’s right to self-defence, or
even whether one argues for the justi-
fied deaths of innocents through the
just war theory’s use of the doctrine
of double effect, there are many
instances where a harm is caused
that needs to be accounted for. This
ethical weight cannot in this instance
be carried by the AI because it is not a
full moral agent, as it does not have
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autonomy. So, because the machine
itself cannot carry the weight of
these ethical harms, they must rest
elsewhere, and, given the increasing
use of machine-learning by AIs, are
likely to be decisions made that
cause harm and become the property
of someone who is several times
removed from the AI’s actual
decision-making. There is a greater
loss of control over the AI, while
there is no subsequent dilution of
responsibility or liability for those in
charge.
The potential cast of those who
could be held responsible includes
the person who programmed the
machine, the commander who
orders to send the robot on a
mission, the senior military leader
who is responsible for deploying
weapons on the battlefield, and
senior policy leaders for authorizing
their use. Drawing on the legal and
philosophical traditions from estab-
lished professions such as law, medi-
cine, engineering, and the rules of
war, there are three key tests that
help determine who is responsible
and what type and level of blame
they subsequently face.45 These tests
include the “duty of care,” whereby
detailing the relationship between
the actors involved outlines the sub-
sequent duties created between
them; the degree to which the actor
had or should have had knowledge
of the implications of their decision;
and their causal involvement.46 It is
important that responsibility does
not necessarily diminish as it is attrib-
uted to people. Responsibility is not
carved up, so that once a pro-
portional is allocated, less is then
left for others. All involved can theor-
etically take all the responsibility for
the harm caused, and if unjustified
punished.
Turning first to the programmer,
they have a duty of care that arises
from their profession to carry out
their job diligently and as best as
they can. If the programmer has
acted with purposefully malicious
intent or with foreseeable negligence,
then they can be held highly respon-
sible for the deaths that their actions
caused. However, the due diligence
bar is quite high as the programmer
should be aware of the implications
of their coding and ensure that suit-
able protections are built in. They
are ethically responsible for the
coding they use, even if they are
ordered to create an offensively pro-
miscuous AI. For example, this
could be conceptualized as the need
to instill basic protective concepts
such as the principle of discrimi-
nation and proportionality, so as not
to allow for a disproportionate harm
against those not involved in the con-
flict or who cease to represent a
threat. If they have done their job as
best as can be reasonably expected
of them, failure to account for all
possible outcomes is not the same as
negligence and their level of respon-
sibility is lowered. Their responsibil-
ity can therefore be low, but it
cannot be non-existent. That is,
while there is a limit to what they
can be reasonably expected to
predict as the outcome of their pro-
gramming, they should also be
aware of their causal relationship to
the AI’s eventual actions. It is
several times removed and there are
intervening causally necessary steps
—the choice to use the weapon, the
choice to launch it, and the choice of
the parameters of use—which
lowers the programmer’s level of
responsibility. But they are still cau-
sally involved because their involve-
ment is a dependent factor; their
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involvement is a necessary one,
though it does not rise to that of an
instigator. This raises the bar on
Robert Sparrow’s argument that
they should bear no responsibility,
but it is likely to be lower than that
of others involved.47
In terms of military personnel, the
debate should focus on command-
level individuals, ranging from mid-
level commanders who order a
specific scenario or engagement, up
to those who set the parameters and
weapons to be used. The soldier
who physically presses the button to
launch the AI-driven weapon is cau-
sally insignificant. They could
disobey the order to press the
button, but their (lack of) involve-
ment does not influence the
decision-making of the AI or the
outcome. Their trigger-pulling
makes very little actual difference to
the performance or involvement of
the machine on the battlefield. In
comparison, strategic decision-
makers have a very real role in the
autonomous machine being on the
battlefield and the sort of targets or
strategic decision-making par-
ameters they use. At all the levels of
commanding officers up to political
policymakers there are clear
instances of a duty of care, foreknow-
ledge, and causal involvement. In
terms of a duty of care, the higher
the rank, the greater the range of
responsibility. This includes a
responsibility to protect and provide
for those below them in the military
hierarchy, a responsibility that those
people in subordinate positions act
according to the rules of war, and a
responsibility for the implications
and outcome of a strategic decision.48
In traditional warfare, the command-
ing officer does not directly puppet
their soldiers, and these individual
soldiers can be held responsible for
any unjustified harm they cause. But
the commanding officer is still
responsible for the overall decision
to deploy them, to ensure that they
are properly trained, informed of
what is expected of them, and to
ensure they are given sufficiently
clear and defined ethical orders.
Those higher up a chain of
command are obligated to actively
know and take responsibility for the
actions of those beneath them.49
Moreover, strategic-level responsibil-
ity means that a commanding officer
has a duty of care to those whose
their decisions are likely to impact.
In Donoghue v Stevenson in 1932, a
key case establishing the duty of
care in questions of liability, Lord
Atkin, writing for the majority,
argued that a relationships includes
any “persons who are so closely and
directly affected by my act that I
ought reasonably to have them in
contemplation as being so affected
when I am directing my mind to the
acts or omissions which are called in
question.”50 This means that posses-
sing a strategic decision-making pos-
ition within an agency creates a
relationship with those on whom
the decisions have an impact. This
in turn feeds into the aspect of fore-
knowledge. Commanders are not
laypeople, but highly specialized
professionals, whose job is to collect
information on those areas under
their command and to act as a reposi-
tory of expertise. Those in a position
of authority or responsibility are
bound by the obligation to be
informed about the repercussions of
their decisions on those within their
care.
Finally, the causal role of com-
manders is such that they are essen-
tially the prime initiators. Given that
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the questions are whether to deploy
automated weapons, against whom,
and what the strategic goals and
costs are, the implications flow from
this point outward. It can be argued,
therefore, that the commanding
officer plays a dependent role; it is
their decision whether to deploy
any particular type of weapon at
any given point, and so they face a
significant degree of blame for any
unjustified harm it causes. Equally,
senior policymakers play a depen-
dent role as well, since they have a
more senior role and hold responsi-
bility for the type of war that is
fought; it is their decision whether
the autonomous weapon is within
the strategist’s toolkit while their pol-
icies also outline the limits and
licences on its use. Policymakers,
therefore, hold one of the most
significant degrees of blame for any
harm the weapon causes.
Without realistically being able to
program in the level of prescriptive
scenarios and outcomes, the only
way forward would be to rely on an
adaptivemachine-learning approach.
But while this might give the illusion
of the AI being separated from its
owners, this is not in fact the case,
and responsibility for its actions and
the moral weight associated with
killing people must still rest with
senior politicians and commanding
officers. This raises the bar signifi-
cantly on the use of autonomous
weapons, as politicians and officers
are now liable for ethical decisions
over which they have no direct
input or control. Ultimately they
would need to be punished for any
unjustified harms cause as if they
had caused them themselves.
Full Autonomy
Because of some of these concerns
there are inevitable moves towards
developing an AI with full autonomy.
That is, a machine that would rep-
resent a full ethical agent where the
AI Is able to make its own decisions
by developing its own ethical frame-
work, built bottom-up from core
ethical principles provided. This
scenario would give firmer grounds
to make the argument that the AI
could take responsibility for its
actions. To achieve this state would
represent an ethical-singularity
point for AI technology and while it
would be able to work from some
given basic principles, it would need
the capacity to review, reflect, and
rewrite them, while also being able
to reflect and understand the impli-
cations of its own processes. While
autonomy should be seen as a spec-
trum that in humans has different
forms, instances, and degrees, pos-
sessing autonomy for a machine
requires a distinct and clear step
above even the most complex forms
of automation. However, while it
could be argued that the AI’s ability
to pull the trigger, whether in target
choice or attack command, would
mimic the same level of decision-
making as that of the ordinary
soldier who is equally limited when
they are given a mission to accom-
plish, this comparison weakens the
argument that autonomous machines
have autonomy rather than strength-
ening the case. That is, a soldier
always possesses the option to
refuse an order, and is expected to
do so when given ethically
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unjustified commands. The limits
placed on the soldier through mili-
tary or social conditioning are not
built into the very fabric of their
being, as they would be for a
machine. Autonomous machines are
acting independently rather than
with the capacity for reflection on
the nature of their actions: they act
autonomously, not with autonomy.
This position is based on the
understanding that the concept of
autonomy is the capacity for self-
rule. As Martha Nussbaum puts it,
autonomy is the capacity to “form a
conception of the good and to
engage in critical reflection about
the planning of one’s life.”51 For
humans this requires, first, that the
individual’s ability to function ration-
ally is protected, and that the individ-
ual has the capacity to plan, choose,
and reflect on options in terms of
arguments, evidence and potential
choices so as to make a decision.52
Secondly, in order for an individual
to be an autonomous agent he or
she must be free to direct his or her
decision-making process, meaning
that it should not be excessively influ-
enced or controlled by another force.
They have the capacity to make
decisions freely, without undue influ-
ence, control or distortion, free from
lying, manipulation, coercion, or dis-
torting influences. This requires the
actor to have freewill—the freedom
to decide and then put those
decisions into practice.53 For a
machine, the idea of autonomy is
similar, where it should have the
capacity in terms of physical proces-
sing power, access to relevant knowl-
edge, as well as the freedom—that is,
opportunity without constraint or
influence—to make its own
decisions. This could support the
bottom-up approach to
programming the machine’s AI,
where the ability to make decisions
is achieved by providing it with
some basic principles from which it
can build its own framework of
analysis and decision-making to
determine the correct course of
action. However, having autonomy
requires the AI to be able to reflect
on all of its decision-making and its
fundamental assumptions and
ethical framework, coming to its
own conclusions regarding which
ethical theory to choose, which
stimuli to include, how to weigh the
respective elements involved, how
to make the calculation, and by
which means the correct action is
determined. This level of reflection
should have the capacity to evaluate
all assumptions and parameters at
all levels, with the capacity to dis-
agree, rewrite, and recreate even the
most basic of assumptions. There-
fore, the AI’s processing needs to be
not only bottom-up, but also
bottom-down, re-evaluating its basic
parameters according to its own
logic and to even question its own
logical processes by which it makes
those reflections. The decision-
making processes need to be multi-
directional: bottom-up, top-down,
bottom-down, and infinitely further
down.
The first challenge, therefore, is
determining what basic understand-
ings should act as the AI’s first prin-
ciples. For example, it could be
argued that a very thin form of uni-
versal ethics could be created to act
as the most basic of principles from
which to expand. For example, the
principle to “do no harm” or the
“right to life” might be considered
as being universally accepted prin-
ciples and could be used to build
further ethical principles that
Ross W. Bellaby
14
include the right to self-defence.
However, this offers some initial
issues. First, the human condition is
more than just physical integrity
where self-defence is often defined
as the right to protect against phys-
ical attack, and arguably also
includes the need for autonomy,
liberty, and privacy. That is, it is not
sufficient to just focus on physical
integrity alone. Having complete
physical safety at the expense of
also having the freedom to decide
for oneself how to experience it, for
example, is not a better state.
Without widening the understanding
of what it means to protect the
human condition, it could be logical
to devise a system where everyone
is safe but imprisoned. To avoid
such an outcome, it would be necess-
ary to widen the thin layer slightly,
which then raises questions on how
to measure additional criteria and
comparatively reconcile them. The
wider one goes in defining basic prin-
ciples, therefore, the more opportu-
nity there is for disagreement,
contradictions, and irreconcilable
dilemmas. A second issue is why
human beings necessarily have
primacy as the ethical unit over
other entities. Should other species
or even the whole ecosystem be
included within the ethical calcu-
lation and if so, as what unit of
measurement? This in turn widens
the parameters even further and
increases the chance for contradic-
tions in terms of determining what
to protect or harm and when, or it
could result in an action far
removed from the creator’s own
belief system.
The wider the initial principles
become, the less likely one is to be
able to argue that the principles can
be agreed on as fundamental and do
not simply reflect the programmer’s
own ethical biases. There are
examples of methodologies within
ethical thought that could offer a
means of reconciling such contradic-
tions. For example, William David
Ross provides a decision procedure




priority when they come into conflict.
But this process is one based on intui-
tion, through self-evident contempla-
tion and the avoidance of
contradiction. Or John Rawls’s
“reflective equilibrium” could be
used, where through a deliberative
process we reflect and revise our
assumptions and conclusions
through “considered judgments.”
However, this again relies on a set
of pre-existing considerations that
humans possess by virtue of the
human condition. The AI has no
inherent sense of value—either of
itself or of other entities. The AI has
no direct right to life, for example,
on which it can make its own base
references. Value is programmed
into it. But the AI should have the
capacity to reflect on these norms
and should be provided with the
option of accepting, altering, adapt-
ing, or rejecting them. This would
involve installing a process by
which the AI could make such a re-
evaluation of the intuition-based
principles provided to it. The AI
would require some base against
which to make its re-evaluation, a
base it should also have the capacity
to re-evaluate and change, requiring
some other point to judge from, ad
infinitum. The AI should be able to
question anything and everything
told to it, including the primacy of
the human as the moral unit, the
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primacy of the state that produced it,
the relative value of life over other
valuable items in the world, such as
the ecosystem, social stability, global
stability, and other species. Even the
parameters of the decision-making
processes need to be open to review
in terms of timeframe—that is, how
far into the future should it think
about the implications of its actions?
This highlights the fundamental chal-
lenge, therefore, of how to instill a set
of principles which the AI can reflect
on and change by referring to some
other core principles, which it
should be able to review and change
through some mechanism, without
falling into the trap of restricting its
autonomy in some way and forcing
it to be a complex but only automated
system.
This is further complicated by the
issue of impartiality.54 We can talk of
impartiality in terms of the ethical
rules themselves being impartial,
the application of the rule being
done impartially, or the impartial
observation of all individuals repre-
senting equal moral units. For
example, impartiality frames the
role of universalization, so that the
same ethical rules should apply to
all; you cannot apply a special set of
rules for yourself and subject differ-
ent groups to a different rule set.55
For example, love and loyalty to
one’s family are often seen as a
virtue or a good, which might be
taken as an example of partiality,
but this particular favoritism should
be available for all; all people
should have the same right to prefer
their own family. This impartiality
also points us towards the equality
between moral units, that all individ-
uals have equal moral significance.
Not that all individuals should be
treated equally, but that they all
represent an equal unit in one’s
ethical calculations.56 That everyone
has the same rights, claims, and
obligations.57
It is not surprising that the ethical
frameworks already discussed have
strong impartiality elements to
them. For example, rule consequenti-
alism takes the position that the best
rules to create are those that foster
the greatest overall consequences,
by promoting the overall good
impartially conceived. Importantly,
the just war tradition assumes a
measure of impartiality. It does not
argue that one state has the right to
cause harm to another simply
because of who it is; rather it has
the right because the other state rep-
resents a threat to its own survival.
Those individuals who are not
directly threatening are illegitimate
targets and should be avoided in the
war; their membership, even in the
citizenry of a threatening state, does
not make them legitimate targets.
The implications for designing an
AI are that any core fundamental
principle established would need to
be applied equally. Even with a fun-
damental “right to life,” the
machine should not value a citizen
of the manufacturing nation as
worth more ethically than that of a
non-citizen. Again, an AI would not
have the same emotional ties human
beings have to even skew this impar-
tiality calculation slightly. These
emotional values would have to pro-
grammed into it. Where it could be
reasonable for an individual to
prefer their home community over
another, and so act to defend it in
terms of physical and cultural protec-
tion, even at the expense of killing
more foes than the number of lives
they seek to protect, this emotional
or social valuation cannot be built
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into the AI’s core criteria. A threat to
one’s own life will, for that person
and from their point of view, rep-
resent a greater imperative than a
similar threat faced by another. A
machine making this evaluation
from the impartial point of view,
however, cannot favor two equal
threats to two separate individuals.
This in turn makes the type of
moral dilemma already discussed
more problematic without a clear
directive or imperative to break the
contradiction.
Indeed, this could lead to the cre-
ation of moral dilemmas not ordina-
rily faced by human beings. For
example, it would be unclear how
the AI would respond to two
threats it could equally prevent but
physically would not be able to;
how would it break the log-jam
when two sides present equally jus-
tified through different arguments
as to why they are acting in self-
defence. How could one guarantee
that the AI would favor one’s own
side in a war over the others; wars
necessarily involve harm on both
sides, and if right to life is the core
basis of its ethical evaluation, then
it might decide that killing its
owners results in the less overall
harm done. It might even take a
long-term analysis and look at
threats outside the war ranging
from social injustice, hunger,
poverty, disease, and global
warming, each of which represents
an unrealized threat to individuals.
The AI might be able to decide, but
lack of clarity over quantification of
the threat, equality of all moral
units, a lack of natural preference
or another way of tipping the
scales in an ethical deadlock, or a
lack of timeframe would make the
decision highly unpredictable.
Conclusion
The use of AI in weaponry is no
doubt going to be a growing field.
However, it has been argued that
there are some significant problems
connected to how such weapons are
conceptualized. Highly complex
machine-learning might give the
illusion of the AI making the ulti-
mate decision, and in many ways,
the human becomes so far
removed from the actual decision-
making process this illusion is
understandable. But in reality, the
AI is still limited by the code and
so is still an elongated extension of
its human operators. They are still
responsible for the harm caused,
and given that acts of war are
necessarily about causing harm,
the human operators need to be
ready to assume that harm. The
problem becomes whether they
ever could assume responsibility
for something over which they
now have no control. The alterna-
tive route of an AI with full auton-
omy is equally problematic, and
also most fantastical. The level of
critical self-reflection it would
need is not only lightyears away
in terms of being a technical possi-
bility, but the end result is an AI
that could decide to defy its
owners, and in a weapon this is
too unstable and unreliable a
feature to be of any use.
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